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Abstract
We consider a matching model of the labour market where workers that diﬀer
in quality send signals to firms that are also vertically diﬀerentiated. Signals allow
assortative matching in which the highest quality workers send the highest signals
and are hired by the best firms. Matching is consider under both transferable
and non-transferable utility. In both cases payoﬀs are determined by relative
position - the best worker gets the best job. The standard signalling model which
communicates the signaller’s absolute type is a special case of the current model of
signalling relative position. Second, in the relative model, equilibrium strategies
and payoﬀs depend on the distributions of types of workers and the distribution of
firms. This is in contrast with separating equilibria of the standard model which
do not respond to changes in supply or demand. Surprisingly in some cases there
can be ineﬃciently little investment in signalling.
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1 Introduction
It is more than thirty years since Spence (1973) introduced the now famous insight
that investment in education could be undertaken as a signal to prospective employers.
In this classic model some workers are more productive than others, but employers
are not diﬀerentiated. Although Spence’s work provided many important insights,
one peculiarity of his model (and subsequent elaborations such as Mailath (1987)) is
that in any separating equilibrium, strategies and outcomes, such as wages, do not
respond to changes in the relative frequency of high and low quality workers. That is,
strangely, the wages of skilled workers do not respond to changes in the supply of either
skilled or unskilled labour. The same year Becker (1973) attempted to explain positive
assortment in marriage, why most commonly like marries like. His formal model allowed
for vertical diﬀerentiation on both sides of the marriage market. Some labour markets
seem to be similar, with workers competing for high quality jobs. More recently, Cole,
Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 1995) introduced a model which one can call a “matching
tournament”, in which agents make an investment decision before participating in a
matching market. If that investment is a signal of otherwise unobservable ability, then
matching tournaments integrate aspects of both Spence’s and Becker’s models
This paper investigates matching tournaments under incomplete information. Work-
ers undertake visible eﬀort to signal underlying heterogeneous ability. Employers are
also vertically diﬀerentiated, but this is observable. In a separating equilibrium, there is
positive assortative matching with high quality workers sending high signals and being
matched with high quality firms. When utility is non-transferable between workers and
firms, equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs depend on the distributions of characteristics of
both firms and workers. When utility is transferable and there is bargaining over wages,
using the stronger assumption that workers and firms are complements in production,
then also equilibrium wages depend on the distribution of types of firms and workers.
That is, there is a dependence on demand and supply absent in Spence’s original model.
Furthermore, outcomes depend on relative position: one’s wage and equilibrium payoﬀ
depend on the characteristics of others as much as they do on one’s own.
There is, therefore, a fundamental diﬀerence from Spence (1973), where equilibrium
strategies and payoﬀs depend only on the absolute characteristics of workers. Specif-
ically, in a separating equilibrium of the classic model, employers can infer the exact
productivity of workers from their level of education. As a result, the signaller’s equilib-
rium payoﬀs are determined by the absolute level of her productivity, for example, she
ends up being paid her marginal product. In the current model, however, a signaller’s
payoﬀ will instead depend on her rank in the distribution of types in the population.
For example, the best candidate will get the best job, independent of his absolute level
of ability. Furthermore, how much he has to signal to communicate successfully that he
is the best candidate will depend on the entire distribution of workers’ characteristics.
In contrast, in the classic model, equilibrium strategies depend only on an incentive
compatibility condition derived from individual preferences. Therefore, they do not
change in response to competitive pressures, as they do here.
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One crucial aspect is that there are two potential changes in the competitive situ-
ation: changes in the distribution of workers and changes in the distribution of firms.
It is possible to carry out both forms of comparative statics. For example, one can
look at the eﬀect of an improvement in the quality of workers or the quality of firms by
changes in the respective distribution that satisfy first order stochastic dominance or
one of its refinements. An improvement in the quality of workers or a decrease in the
quality of jobs increases the competitiveness of the market and lowers workers’ utility at
each level of ability. Signalling increases for most types of worker, but not for all. Such
a change in market conditions will induce low ability workers to reduce the eﬀort put
into signalling. When utility is transferable, that is, there is bargaining over wages, an
increase in competitiveness also reduces the wage for a given ability level. Importantly,
the eﬀect of an increase in the quality of firms is equal but opposite: it lowers signalling
but raises workers’ utility.
There are two important implications from these comparative statics. First, there
are relative eﬀects not present in a classic model: the equilibrium outcome for any
worker depends on the quality of other workers in the market. Second, since the eﬀects
are equal and opposite, if the two distributions were changed simultaneously in the same
direction, there would be no net eﬀect. In particular, the classic signalling models of
Spence (1973) and Mailath (1987) can be derived as a special case of our model simply
by setting the two distributions on either side of the market to be identical. This also
clarifies how our work diﬀers from that of Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 2001)
who pioneered the analysis of matching tournaments but who concentrated on this
special case.1
An important part of Becker’s (1973) analysis is the distinction between transferable
(TU) and non-transferable (NTU) utility. It is assumed that any match, between hus-
band and wife or between a worker and a firm, produces a surplus that is then divided
between the partners. In the NTU case, there are exogenous limits on what divisions
are possible. A labour market example is that in some European university systems
wages are fixed at a national level, so there can be no bargaining over salary. One
might think that this is the source of the relative eﬀects of the present model. Imagine
that the quality of workers is poor, the best of that poor bunch would get the best job
even if low quality in absolute terms. In contrast, in the TU case one might wonder
whether any such positional rents would be bargained away: low quality workers could
be oﬀered low wages. In the end, just as in the classical models, workers would be paid
their product. It is shown in Section 4 of this paper that this is not the case. Provided
that the additional assumption is made that the attributes of workers and firms are
strict complements in production, equilibrium wages, signalling and welfare all depend
on the distributions of characteristics of both firms and workers.
Equilibria under incomplete information are usually ineﬃcient when compared to
outcomes under complete information. Indeed, whereas Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite
1They also concentrate on situations of complete information, with a brief treatment of signalling
only in Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1995).
2
(2001) find that a matching tournament can produce an eﬃcient amount of investment
under transferable utility and complete information. The competition for matches solves
the usual hold-up problem. Here under incomplete information, the incentive to signal
to achieve a better match drives up the amount of investment to an ineﬃciently high
level, even when the signal is a productive investment such as education. However,
under non-transferable utility, the question as to whether eﬃciency is reached is more
complicated. In fact, surprisingly workers of low ability may invest too little, even under
incomplete information.
This type of model may be important because many real world labour markets,
particularly for professionals, have a structure that is not too far distant from Becker’s
marriage model. There is careful eﬀort devoted by both sides to ensuring a good match
between employer and employee, and intense competition for high ranked employers
and for star candidates. Some, such as entry level markets for physicians, actually use
explicit matching schemes (see, for example, Roth (2002) for a survey). Of course, the
current work abstracts away from the modelling the exact matching algorithm that in
practice must be used. Other labour markets without central matching are subject to
greater search frictions. Shimer and Smith (2002) and Smith (2002) find conditions for
approximate positive assortative matching in explicit search models, under transferable
and non-transferable utility respectively. Finally, the current approach assumes that
all workers have the same preferences over all jobs whereas in real markets preferences
are surely more idiosyncratic. See Clark (2003) for an analysis of matching with such
horizontal diﬀerentiation.
2 Matching Tournaments
In this section, I develop a model of a tournament, where a large population of contes-
tants compete in a matching market. We have in mind three prime examples. The first
is students competing for places at college. The second is the marriage market. The
third is a market for jobs. For example, students in the final year of graduate school
seek faculty positions at universities. We will use the terminology of this last case and
talk about workers and firms. We also make the simplifying assumption that workers
have a common ordering over potential jobs. That is, in the academic job market for
example, all graduating students have a consensus over which would be the best uni-
versity position to get, what would be the second best and so on. In contrast, while
the employers all agree that they would like to hire the most able candidate, the ability
of candidates is not observable. Rather potential employers must infer the ability of
workers from an investment decision, for example in education, made before matching.
We will look at equilibria where all employers will rank all workers in terms of this in-
vestment. In the current work, the employers have no investment decision of their own
to make. Indeed, we can also consider the special case of competitive situations such as
sports tournaments where the “firms” are only inanimate monetary prizes, which are
assigned to candidates according to their performance.
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The model can be considered as an incomplete information version of the model
introduced by Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992), hereafter CMP. However, we gen-
eralise their model to allow for diﬀerent distributions of characteristics on the two sides
of the market. This will allow both for a richer model and for comparative statics
analysis of the eﬀect of changes in those distributions. This is also how our model is
diﬀerentiated from standard signalling models. As we demonstrate in Section 3, we can
derive a more traditional signalling model by setting the distributions on the two sides
of the market to be identical.
There are two populations of agent: workers and firms. They are diﬀerentiated in
quality with a worker’s type being z with z distributed on [z, z¯] with z ≥ 0 according
to the distribution G(z). The distribution G(z) is twice diﬀerentiable with strictly
positive bounded density g(z). Firms are also diﬀerentiated in their attribute s which
has the twice diﬀerentiable distribution function H(s) on [s, s¯] and strictly positive
bounded density h(s) (in the case of a sports tournament H(s) is just the distribution
of prize money). The workers will compete amongst themselves to match with the firms.
In particular, workers must choose a visible level of output or investment x from the
positive real line [0,∞). Following Spence, this could be a choice of education level. An
worker’s type z has the general interpretation as her ability, and is positively related
with the worker’s productivity. After the choice of output/investment, matching will
take place, with one worker matching with each firm.2 A match between a worker of
type z investing x with a firm of type s will produce output π(z, s, x), where π(·) is an
increasing function. As we will see, stable matching will be positive and assortative.
That is, workers with high x will match with firms with high s.
We now consider preferences, under the assumption of non-transferable utility (NTU)
(we go on to consider transferable utility in Section 4). That is, there are some ben-
efits arising from the match between firm and worker that are not dividable and/or
excludable. Here I assume that some aspect of a firm’s type s that is attractive to
workers but which cannot be divided between worker and firm. In the context of the
academic job market, s could be interpreted as prestige or reputation of a university,
in the marriage market, s could be a measure of attractiveness to the opposite sex. In
sports tournaments, it is simply the value of a cash prize. Any cash payments from
firms to to workers are not negotiable. Hence, workers in their choice of match care
solely about the value of s in a firm.3
For the workers, we assume that each has the same utility function U(z, s, x) that
depends on her type, match and action respectively. This is similar to the general sig-
nalling model of Mailath (1987) that assumes signallers’ (here workers’) payoﬀs depend
2This model does allow for a single firm to hire multiple workers in the following limited way. The
distribution of firms H(s) can be relabelled the distribution of jobs, several of which may by oﬀered
by a single firm. However, the assumption that H(s) is continuous means that every job is diﬀerent,
one firm cannot oﬀer (a positive measure of) identical jobs.
3For example, in some European countries, academic wages are fixed by national agreement.
Since all universities pay the same, candidates simply prefer to be employed by the most prestigious
institution.
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on their type, action and type as perceived by the receivers (here firms). In a separating
equilibrium, by definition, the perceived type is equal to the true type, so that in the
traditional model the utility a signaller receives would be of the form U(z, z, x). In
a matching tournament, however, even when there is a separating equilibrium and so
perceived type equals true type, the exact payoﬀ that a worker receives will depend on
the matching scheme in place and will not depend solely on his true type. However, the
model is still close enough to draw upon Mailath’s (1987) results. To this end, I make
similar assumptions on the workers’ utility function as follows:
1. U is twice continuously diﬀerentiable (smoothness);
2. Uz(z, s, x) > 0, Us(z, s, x) > 0 (monotonicity);
3. Uzx(z, s, x) > 0 and Uzs(z, s, x) > 0 (complementarity);
4. Ux(z, s, x) = 0 has a unique solution in x denoted γ(z, s) that maximises U(z, s, x)
and Uxx(z, s, x) < 0 (concavity);
Firms in their choice of worker prefer workers of high productivity. Within that
general framework, we can consider three special cases.
Story 1: Complete Information Here a worker’s observable action x represents the
production of an asset useful to the firms. For example, a worker’s investment in
human capital may make her an attractive hire. The product of a match is strictly
increasing in the worker’s investment: πx(z, s, x) > 0,πz(z, s, x) = 0
Story 2A: Valueless Signalling. Here the observable action x is costly to the worker,
but serves no use in itself to firms. However, it may act as signal of a worker’s type
z and the utility of firms is increasing in the type of their match. For example, as in
Spence’s (1973) classic model, education may signal ability. The product of a match is
strictly increasing in the worker’s type: πz(z, s, x) > 0,πx(z, s, x) = 0
Story 2B: Constructive Signalling. Here the observable action x increases output. How-
ever, output also depends on a worker’s unobservable type z. For example, education
may both signal ability and increase human capital. The product of a match is strictly
increasing in both the worker’s type and her investment: πx(z, s, x) > 0,πz(z, s, x) > 0
Note that Stories 1, 2A and 2B can be similar on a formal level under NTU if in
the signalling equilibrium in 2A or 2B, the equilibrium is symmetric with output x
increasing in type z. Then, a high visible output will indicate a high type and lead to
a good match, so that the incentives for a worker over his choice of x may be identical
as in the case when a high x brings an intrinsic benefit.
Following CMP (1992, 1998), a matching is a function φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]∪{∅} that is
measure-preserving and one-to-one on φ([0, 1]), where φ(i) = j ∈ [0, 1] is i0s match and
φ(i) = ∅ indicates that i is not matched. That is, for all measurable subsets A ⊂ [0, 1],
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φ−1(A) is measurable and λ(φ−1(A)) = λ(A), where λ denotes Lebesgue measure. A
matching is stable if there does not exist i 6= i0 ∈ [0, 1] such that φ(i0)Piφ(i) and iPφ(i0)i0,
with both preferences holding strictly.
The first condition is the equivalent in a continuum of requiring exactly one worker
being matched to one firm. The second is the stability condition standard in most
matching problems, that requires that matches made are not subject to unravelling in
the sense that it should not be possible to find a worker and a firm who would prefer
to match with each other in place of their current matches. In the case of incomplete
information (Stories 2A and 2B) matching is done with respect to visible output x. That
is, a firm prefers a worker i over a worker j if and only if xi > xj. This can be incentive
compatible with the true underlying preferences of the firms when the distribution of x
in the population of workers corresponds to the distribution of z (Stories 2A and 2B).
The theoretical exercise here is to find conditions for when this is the case.
In this context, an equilibrium will be a strategy x(z) for the workers and an asso-
ciated matching scheme that is stable given observable output and the strategy x(z).
Furthermore, for incentive compatibility, the matching is required to be stable ex post.
That is, firms do not regret their match once the type of the worker has been revealed.
We call such an equilibrium symmetric if all workers use the same strategy, that is, the
same mapping x(z) from type to output.
Suppose for the moment that the equilibrium strategy x(z) is diﬀerentiable and
strictly increasing (we will go on to show that such an equilibrium exists). Let us
aggregate all the output decisions of the workers into a distribution summarised by
a distribution function F (x). A strictly increasing symmetric strategy implies that
in equilibrium an agent of type zi who produces x(zi) would have a position in the
distribution of output F (x(zi)) equal to his rank G(zi) in the distribution of ability.
This enables the firms to infer which worker is in fact the most able. This in turn allows
the matches to be made through the following assortative matching mechanism so that
workers with high (respectively low) x are matched with firms with high (respectively
low) s. More specifically, a worker’s rank in level of output determines the rank of
his match. That is, a worker making a choice xi will achieve a match of value si =
H−1(F (xi)) or F (xi) = H(si). Then, we can show that the assortative scheme outlined
above is stable. That is, we can find no worker and firm who would both prefer each
other in place of their current match.4
Lemma 1 Suppose the utility of firms is strictly increasing in x (Story 1) or in z
(Story 2A) or in both x and z (Story 2B). Suppose all workers adopt a symmetric
strictly increasing strategy x(z), then the assortative matching, such for a worker of
4Results of this type go back to Becker (1973). See Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1995), Fernandez
and Gal´ı (1999) for a tournament approach similar to that employed here. Eeckhout (2000) and Legros
and Newman (2004) find conditions for when positive assortative matching is the only stable matching
scheme.
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type zi for any zi ∈ [z, z¯], with output xi = x(zi) her match is of type si, where
G(zi) = F (xi) = φ (F (xi)) = H(si), (1)
is the only stable matching.
We now derive a symmetric equilibrium strategy for the workers. Suppose all agents
adopt a strictly increasing diﬀerentiable strategy x(z). Then the equilibrium relation-
ship (1) implies that we can define the function
S(z) = H−1(G(z)) (2)
which gives the equilibrium match of a worker of type z that depends on both G and





This implies an equilibrium utility of the form:
U(z, S(z), x(z)) (4)
Note that utility, through S(z), now depends on both the distribution G(z) of workers’s
types and the distribution H(s) of firms’ characteristics.
Suppose positive assortative matching was assigned by a central planner, rather
than determined by the workers’ competitive choice of investment. Then, what level
of investment would workers choose? Since in general, workers gain some direct utility
from their own investment x, their choice will not in general be zero. This level of
investment that is optimal in the absence of matching considerations will be useful as a
point of comparison with the Nash equilibrium level of investment that will eventually
be derived.
Definition 1 Let x = γN(z) maximise U(z, S(z), x), that is the condition Ux(z, S(z), γN(z)) =
0 holds at every level of z ∈ [z, z¯]. The function γN(z) is called the privately optimal
level of investment x under NTU.
Suppose now one agent produces x(zˆ) in place of her equilibrium choice x(z) and
then chooses zˆ to maximise her payoﬀ. Her reduced form utility is U(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)).
This gives a first order condition
Ux (z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ))x
0(zˆ) + Us(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ))S0(zˆ) = 0. (5)
Now, in a symmetric equilibrium it must be that zˆ = z. Using this and rearranging the
resulting first order condition, we have the following diﬀerential equation.
x0(z) = −Us(z, S(z), x)
Ux(z, S(z), x)
S0(z) (6)
This diﬀerential equation will give us our equilibrium strategy, in combination with the
boundary condition we now derive.
7
Lemma 2 In a symmetric equilibrium of the matching tournament with positive assor-
tative matching and continuous strictly increasing strategies, x(z) = γN(z).
Proof: In a symmetric equilibrium, an individual with ability z has rank 0 and
utility U(z, s, x) = U(z, s, x(z)) that does not depend on the agent’s rank. Therefore,
in equilibrium she chooses x to maximize U(z, s, x). That is, she must choose γN(z), or
there would be a profitable deviation.
The lowest ranked worker acts as though matching considerations did not matter.
This reflects the equilibrium competitive response to the expectation that one is going
to come last.
Proposition 1 The unique solution to the diﬀerential equation (6) on (z, z¯] together
with the boundary condition, x(z) = γN(z), and the assortative matching scheme (1)
constitute the unique symmetric separating equilibrium to the tournament matching
game under NTU and Story 1, Story 2A or Story 2B. Equilibrium investment x(z)
is greater than the privately optimal level γN(z) everywhere on (z, z¯].
The proof follows (see the Appendix) from the results of Mailath (1987) on the
existence of separating equilibria in standard signalling models. The method is to
show that any symmetric increasing equilibrium strategy x(z) is continuous and then
diﬀerentiable. Hence, it must constitute a solution to the diﬀerential equation (6),
which has a unique solution on (z, z¯]. The main technical problem is that at z, Ux
is zero, implying that the derivative x0 is unbounded. However, imposition of the
boundary condition, see Lemma 2, together with boundedness of Ux is enough to rule out
multiple solutions to the diﬀerential equation. The result only concerns fully separating
equilibria. It is impossible to rule out other equilibria. As in standard signalling models,
there also exist many pooling equilibria.
An important question will be whether separating equilibria are eﬃcient. Compare
x(z) with γN(z). From the point of view of workers, they are Pareto ranked. They
obtain the same match in both cases, but with higher eﬀort in the separating equilib-
rium. All workers (except the lowest type z) would be better oﬀ under γN(z). However,
this privately optimal investment level is not a Nash equilibrium. To be clear, although
workers would be better oﬀ under γN(z), it may not be socially optimal. When invest-
ment is productive and enters into the utility of firms (Stories 1, 2B), welfare is a more
complex issue. We discuss this further in Section 5 and after.
3 Signaling Relative versus Absolute Productivity
In the signalling model introduced by Spence (1973) in a separating equilibrium, the
worker is paid his marginal product which is revealed by the equilibrium strategy. In
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the case of a continuum of types, Mailath (1987) gives the equivalent conditions. In the
current notation, if all agents adopt a strictly increasing strategy x(z), then if an agent
of type zi makes a choice xi, an observer can infer that an agent’s type is zi = x
−1(xi).
In the context of an otherwise competitive labour market, if an agent’s type is her
productivity, she would then be paid zi. More generally, Mailath assumes an agent’s
utility is given by U(z, zˆ, x), where zˆ is the agent’s perceived type.
Our current model diﬀers in that the reward structure does not depend on the
(inferred) type of an agent, rather it depends on his rank. That is, here equilibrium
payoﬀs depend on G(zˆ) rather than zˆ, or from (4), U(z,H−1(G(zˆ)), x). It might seem
that the utility formulation used here, as it has the same basic arguments z, zˆ, x, is a
special case of the Spence/Mailath absolute signalling model. However, I would argue
the opposite is true, the absolute is a special case of the relative.
First, reducing utility to the form U(z, zˆ, x) removes the dependence of an individ-
ual’s utility on the distributions of workers’ and firms’ characteristics. In the relative
model, changes in the characteristics of others can aﬀect the utility of an agent who
remains unchanged herself. Second, it is possible to reproduce the standard signalling
model within the relative model. In the Spence model, the labour market is compet-
itive given the available information. For example, since in a separating equilibrium
a worker’s productivity is revealed, she is paid her marginal product. In the present
context, the equilibrium reward for each agent must be equal to his type, or S(z) = z.
Note that this condition will automatically be satisfied if G(·) = H(·), that is, the
distribution of rewards from jobs is identical to the distribution of types. Let us look
at the eﬀect of this in the context of the simple signalling model considered earlier.
If indeed G(·) = H(·), then S(z) = z, S0(z) = 1 and s = z, so that the diﬀerential
equation (6) reduces to
x0(z) = −Us(z, z, x)
Ux(z, z, x)
, (7)
which is eﬀectively the same as that given in Mailath (1987, p1353).
Notice that in contrast to the general case, the diﬀerential equation does not depend
on the distribution functions H(s) and G(z). Consequently, unlike in the model of
signalling relative position, changes in the distribution of types or jobs have no eﬀect
on the equilibrium strategy. Or rather, since as we will see later in Section 6, changes
in the two distributions have opposite eﬀects, when as here the two distributions are
constrained to be equal to each other, a movement of one distribution is cancelled out
by the movement of the other.
This is not to say that there is no change at all. Even though the equilibrium
strategy does not change, the level of output will respond to simultaneous movements
in the distribution of abilities and jobs. For example, suppose both G(z) and H(s) are
uniform on [0,1], and the equilibrium strategy is x(z) = z/2. Now, if both distributions
are changed so that now G(z) = z2 and H(s) = s2 on [0, 1] and the average z rises from




The argument of this paper is that there is a distinction between signalling relative and
absolute position. It would seem a reasonable hypothesis, however, that the diﬀerence
would melt away once utility is transferable. For example, if a particular job has high
non-monetary benefits, an employer may compensate by oﬀering a lower salary. For
example, it is often said that the oldest and most prestigious universities do not pay
their faculty the highest salaries. Nonetheless, we find here that we can obtain similar
results to those with non-transferable utility, in that even here, equilibrium strategies
and utility depend upon relative position.
Suppose in contrast to what we have assumed up to now that the surplus created by
matching is continuously divisible between the two partners. As Becker (1973) discov-
ered, in this case assortative matching is only stable if the two attributes, here z and
s, are complements in a joint production process. This is in contrast with the situation
with the non-transferable utility assumed up to now, where all that was required for
stability was that workers’ utility was increasing in s and firms’ utility was increasing
in z.
In this section, we assume that if a worker with attribute z is matched with a firm of
type s then they will have a joint product π(z, s, x). Assume that the function π is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable with partial derivatives πz(z, s, x) > 0 and πs(z, s, x) > 0,
but πx(z, s, x) ≥ 0. Furthermore, assume the cross partial derivative πzs(z, s, x) are
strictly positive, z and s are complements in production. Let πxs(z, s, x) ≥ 0. Lastly,
assume πxx(z, s, x) ≤ 0.
Denote the share of this product that goes to the worker as w(z, x), and share of the
firm r = π(z, s, x) − w(z, x). We now replace the original form of the worker’s utility
with U(z, w, x). That is, now the worker only values a match in terms of the wages
she will receive from that job. Otherwise the utility function has the same properties
and satisfies the same assumptions 1.− 4. as in Section 2. Lastly, assume in addition a
further condition
5. Uwx(z, w, x) ≤ 0 for x ≥ γ(z, w).
Under transferable utility, stability demands that the wage function w(z, x) gives no
worker-firm pair the incentive to match with each other rather than with their current
match. The first step to determining the appropriate level of wages is taken from
Becker’s (1973) observation that the payment to each partner should be related to her
marginal productivity for a matching to be stable. Let us first fix investment at some
constant level x. Then, for our positive assortative matching to be stable, where a
worker of type z is matched with a firm of type S(z) = H−1(G(z)), it must be that
w(z + ε, x) + π(z, S(z), x)− w(z, x) ≥ π(z + ε, S(z), x) (8)
That is, the total payoﬀ to a worker of type z+ε and a firm of type S(z) must be greater
under the current matching arrangements than the output from a matching between
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each other. Otherwise, the worker of type z + ε could strike a bargain with the firm
of type S(z) whereby they would both be better oﬀ. Similarly, if the we fix the type
of worker at z, for stability given two workers producing output levels x + ε and x, it
must be that
w(z, x+ ε) + π(z, S(z), x)− w(z, x) ≥ π(z, S(z), x+ ε) (9)
In an equilibrium of the game of incomplete information, what is assumed is that
matches are made and wage bargains struck on the basis of the perceived type of the
workers. However, in any separating equilibrium, workers’ actions fully reveal their
underlying type. Again, let us assume that all workers adopt the same smooth strategy
x(z), which as it is strictly increasing reveals their type. Later it is shown that such an
equilibrium exists. For now, this assumption together with the above inequalities are
enough to determine the following. Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) oﬀer a much
more complete treatment of the equivalent problem under complete information.5
Proposition 2 Let workers adopt a strictly increasing smooth strategy x(z), and let
C be an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 ≤ C ≤ π(z, s, x(z)), then positive assortative
matching satisfying the relation (1) with the following bargaining solution,
wz(z, x) = πz(z, S(z), x), wx(z, x) = πx(z, S(z), x), (10)




0(t) + πz(t, S(t), x(t))] dt+ C
is stable.
Now, assume all workers adopt the strategy x(z), but one agent contemplates a
deviation to x(zˆ). He would expect a match with a firm of type S(zˆ) and a payment of
w(zˆ, x(zˆ)), even though the actual product of the match will be π(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)). This
gives first order conditions
Ux(z, w(·), x(zˆ))x0(zˆ)+Uw(z, w(·), x(zˆ))wx(zˆ, x(zˆ))x0(z)+Uw(z, w(·), x(zˆ))wz(zˆ, x(zˆ)) = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium zˆ = z. Then, substituting from (10), we obtain the following
diﬀerential equation.
x0(z) =
−Uw(z, w, x)πz(z, S(z), x)
Ux(z, w, x) + πx(z, S(z), x)Uw(z, w, x)
. (11)
We need to define a level of investment x which is privately optimal, that is indepen-
dent of matching considerations. Assume that that the positive assortative matching
scheme S(z) is exogenously imposed. This implies that an increase in x can only in-
crease wages by increasing output not by a more favourable match. Or in other words,
in the absence of matching considerations we need only consider the partial derivative
of wages with respect to output wx(z, x) = πx. This enables the following definition.
5In particular, they show that the bargaining solution here w(z) can have a finite number of disconti-
nuities or jumps, though equally, completely continuous solutions are not excluded. Here, I concentrate
on continuous solutions for reasons of simplicity.
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Definition 2 Let x = γT (z) maximise U(z, w(z), x), that is,
Ux(z, w(z), γT (z)) + Uw(z, w(z), γT (z))πx(z, S(z), γT (z)) = 0,
at every level of z ∈ [z, z¯]. The function γT (z) is called the privately optimal level of
investment x under TU.
This privately optimal level of investment will give us the appropriate boundary
condition for the equilibrium diﬀerential equation.
x(z) = γT (z). (12)
This, together with the earlier Proposition 1, leads to the next result.
Proposition 3 The unique solution to the diﬀerential equation (11) on (z, z¯] together
with the boundary condition (12), the assortative matching scheme (1) and the wage
function (10) constitute a symmetric equilibrium to the tournament matching game
under Story 2A or 2B with transferable utility.
Our equilibrium diﬀerential equation (11), while clearly not identical to the diﬀeren-
tial equation (6) that arose in the NTU case, does depend on the distributions G(z) and
H(s) in a way the diﬀerential equation (7) in the standard model does not. Hence, both
equilibrium payments w(z) and the equilibrium strategy x(z) will respond to changes
in either in the distribution of ability G(z) or of jobs H(z).
We conclude this section with a couple of examples.
Example 1 Workers are distributed according to G(z) = z on [0,1], firms according to
H(s) = s2 on [0,1]. The production function is π(z, s) = zs (Story 2A), which together
with the matching assumption that H(s) = G(z) implies that a worker of type zi matches
with a firm of type si =
√
zi and together they produce z
3/2
i . From the above analysis,
w0(z) = S(z) =
√
z, and given w(0) = 0, w(z) = (2/3)z3/2: workers get a bigger share,
despite s being higher on average than z! This is because a worker’s marginal product
is determined by his match, i.e. the type of his employer, which is higher than her
marginal product, which is determined by the type of her employee.
The next example illustrates that relative eﬀects occur in a strictly smaller set
of cases under NTU than under TU. Suppose we take a production function where
πzs = 0, there are not strict complementarities, we find that the payment to the worker
is determined by her absolute type, even though her equilibrium outcome would be
determined by her relative position under NTU.
Example 2 Assume now the production function is π(z, s) = z+s, so that a worker of
type z matches with a firm of type s = S(z) together they will produce z + S(z). From
the above analysis, w0(z) = 1, and given w(0) = 0, w(z) = z. Each worker gets his paid
his type irrespective of the particular form of two distributions G(z) and H(s).
12
5 Welfare
In this section, I consider whether in matching tournaments investment in visible output
x is socially optimal, or whether it over or under supplied. Which will be the case is
not obvious as there are two factors that work in opposite directions. First, workers
may not internalise the benefit of the eﬀect of additional investment on the profits
of firms, leading to too little investment. Second, competition between workers for
matching opportunities can push investment up, possibly to excessive levels. In the case
of complete information, Cole et al. (2001) find that as investment raises one’s marginal
product, which in a TU framework leads to higher wages, this solves the first problem.
Thus, eﬃcient investment is possible in a non-cooperative equilibrium. However, Peters
(2004) finds that, in a NTU framework, again under perfect information, the second
factor is weaker than the first, and investment is ineﬃciently low.
Incomplete information oﬀers diﬀerent results and also some diﬀerent questions.
Here, I show that investment will be excessive even under TU and even when invest-
ment is productive and not a pure signal. In contrast, under NTU, investment can
be either excessive or insuﬃcient. Rege (2001) shows that if signalling is instrumental
to matching, as it is here, then a separating equilibrium can generate higher welfare
than completely random matching. When there are complements in production, there
is a trade oﬀ between the costs of signalling and the benefits of assortative matching
that it permits. Or, in other words, a more realistic point of comparison for a sig-
nalling equilibrium is with a situation of zero information, rather than one of complete
information.
In the subsequent analysis, I take the more traditional route of comparing the non-
cooperative outcome with first best. If there are complementarities between firms and
workers, then from the results of Becker (1973), the maximisation of total output de-
mands the positive assortative matching scheme S(z). For this reason, in this section I
extend the assumption that there are at least weak complementarities between workers
and firms to the NTU case. Since matching is eﬃcient, this allows us to concentrate on
a diﬀerent issue: whether, for each pair formed under this scheme, the worker chooses
a level of investment that is optimal from the point of view of joint welfare. Often, as
we will see, she invests too much. Sometimes, she invests too little.
5.1 NTU
Assume that the utility of workers is U = U(z, s, x). The utility of a firm is simply the
productivity of the worker it hires π(z, s, x). Total welfare of a match between a firm
and worker is given by
W = U(z, s, x) + π(z, s, x). (13)
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Then the first order conditions for a socially optimal level of investment are
dW
dx
= Ux(z, S(z), x) + πx(z, s, x) = 0 (14)
Note that if πx is zero, so that x is non-productive, the social optimum requires x to
be equal to the privately optimal level γN . If πx > 0, further conditions are needed for
the above condition to be suﬃcient for a social optimum (see Proposition 4 below).
The non-cooperative first order conditions are
dU
dx




If we make the assumption that investment is always productive or πx > 0, then com-
parison of (14) and (15) leads directly to the next result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that πx(z, s, x) > 0 and that πxx(z, s, x) ≤ 0, then there exists
a unique solution γ∗N(z) to the equation (14) at each level of z. Furthermore, for low
types the non-cooperative level of investment x(z) is less than the social optimum γ∗N(z).
That is, there is an z1 > z such that x(z) < γ
∗
N(z) on [z, z1).
Proof: The concavity of U in x and the concavity of p together ensure the first order
conditions (14) define a maximum. We have, for the lowest type, x(z) = γN(z) by
Lemma 2. However, at z, as πx > 0, for a social optimum from (14), the lowest type
should produce more than γN(z).
That is, low types invest too little as their low prospects give no incentive to do more
than which is privately optimal. However, one can also see that there is no fundamental
reason why high types should also invest too little. We imagine that typically they
will invest too much. Particularly, if the production function is concave, then as the
marginal product of investment falls, the socially optimal investment will approach the
cooperative level for high z. Concavity is not necessary for high types to overinvest, as
is now shown by the following example.
Example 3 Let U = x(z−x)+s and π(z, s, x) = x+z+s. Then γ∗N(z) = (1+z)/2. But
if S(z) = z2 on [0,1], then the noncooperative solution is x(z) = 1.28z. The solutions
cross at z1 = 0.641 and the noncooperative investment is higher than the socially optimal
level for higher levels of z.




We continue with the general formulation that allows for x to be productive. A worker of
type z choosing investment x matching with a firm of type s produces output π(z, x, s).
Profits are the residual output or r(z, x) = π(z, x(z), S(z))−w(z, x). Assume that the
utility of workers is U = U(z, w, x). The utility of a firm is simply its profit from hiring
a worker r. The total payoﬀ of a match is given by
W = U(z, w, x) + r(z, x) (16)
Assume for a social optimum that wages reflect only marginal physical product and
not matching considerations so that wx(z, x) = πx(z, S(z), x). Note that this implies
that ∂r/∂x = 0. As the worker appropriates her marginal product from increased
investment, it has no eﬀect on profit. Then the condition for a social optimum is
dW
dx
= Ux(z, w, x) + Uw(z, w, x)πx(z, S(z), x) = 0. (17)
That is, the social optimum equates the marginal cost of investment to the worker Ux
and its marginal product Uwπx. Note that under TU, this condition is the same as
for the privately optimal level of investment γT (z). This reflects the results of CMP
(2001), who find that with complete information, a matching tournament can induce
the eﬃcient amount of investment.
However, under incomplete information there is a gap between private incentives
and the social optimum. For an individual, an increase in investment x both may raise
the output once matched and improve the match achieved. Once matching consid-
erations are included, one has dw(z, x)/dz = πx(z, S(z), x)x
0(z) + πz(z, S(z), x). The
non-cooperative first order conditions are
dU
dx
= Ux(z, w, x) + Uw(z, w, x)πx(z, S(z), x) +
Uw(z, w, x)πz(z, S(z), x)
x0(z)
= 0 (18)
Clearly, comparing (17) and (18), there is an additional positive term in (18). This is
because each individual has an additional private return from increasing output as it
permits a better match.
Proposition 5 In the matching tournament with incomplete information and under
TU, the equilibrium level of output x(z) exceeds the socially optimal level almost every-
where.
Proof: This follows directly from (17) and (18).
6 Comparative Statics
We will now consider the eﬀect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in the
distribution of workers G(z) and changes in the distribution of firms or jobs H(s). In
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doing this, we consider only separating equilibria. We saw in Section 2 that equilibrium
behaviour depends on the matching function S which is jointly determined by G and
H. Our first question is what are the eﬀects of changes in the underlying distributions
on the matching function S(z). We will then be better placed to answer questions
about changes in equilibrium behaviour. In what follows we assume two economies
A,B that are identical apart from having diﬀerent distributions of workers or diﬀerent
distributions of jobs.6
Regime G: Change in the Distribution of Workers. In regime G, we assume that the
economies have identical distributions of jobs, i.e. HA = HB = H, but diﬀer in the
distributions of workers, i.e. GA 6= GB. We also assume that GA and GB have the same
support [z, z¯]. Diﬀerent distributions of workers’ abilities imply that the two societies
have diﬀerent matching functions, i.e. SA(z) = H−1(GA(z)) and SB(z) = H−1(GB(z)).
Regime H: Change in the Distribution of Jobs. In regime H, we assume that the
economies have identical distributions of workers, i.e. GA = GB = G, but diﬀer in the
distributions of jobs, i.e. HA 6= HB. We again assume that HA and HB have the same
support [s, s¯]. Again, diﬀerent distributions of jobs imply that the two economies have
diﬀerent matching functions, i.e. SA(z) = H
−1
A (G(z)) and SB(z) = H
−1
B (G(z)).
We use stochastic dominance to order diﬀerent distributions. One says one distri-
bution GA is stochastically higher or stochastically dominates another distribution GB
if GA(z) ≤ GB(z) for all z.
Proposition 6 Regime G: if GA first order stochastically dominates GB, then SA(z) ≤
SB(z) for all z ∈ [z, z¯].
Proof: The first claim follows as since H(·) is an increasing function so is H−1(·).
Therefore, if for any z, GA(z) ≤ GB(z) then SA(z) ≤ SB(z).
This is illustrated in Figure 2. We can now prove corresponding but very diﬀerent
results for changes in the distribution of jobs.
Proposition 7 Regime H: if HA first order stochastically dominates HB, then SA(z) ≥
SB(z) for all z ∈ [z, z¯].
Proof: First, if HA first order stochastically dominates HB, then we have HA(s) ≤
HB(s) for all s ∈ [s, s¯]. This implies that if G(z) = HA(s+) = HB(s−), then s+ ≥ s−.
But then s+ = H−1A (G(z)) ≥ s− = H−1B (G(z)).
That is, it seems that the comparative statics from changes in H are the reverse to
those from changes in G. See Figures 1 and 2.
6For investigation of the eﬀect of changes in the degree of inequality amongst workers in a similar









Figure 1: Regime G: a worker with given ability zˆ has a match SA under the stochasti-
cally higher distribution of ability GA that is worse than the match SB under the lower
distribution of ability GB.
6.1 NTU
We now apply the above results to see how equilibrium investment and utility respond
to changes in the distribution of ability G(z) and the distribution of jobs H(s). Let




= U∗0(z) = Uz(z, S(z), x(z)) (19)
We first show that an increase in relative competition, in the sense of an increase in
the quality of workers or a decrease in the quality of jobs available reduces equilibrium
utility at every level of ability. In what follows, the assumption that Uzs > 0 and
Uzx > 0 is crucial.
Proposition 8 Suppose that either GA(z) first order stochastically dominates GB(z),
or HB(z) first order stochastically dominates HA(z). Then, U
∗
A(z) ≤ U∗B(z) for all z in
[z, z¯].
Proof: Note that the function U∗(z) is continuously diﬀerentiable as x(z) and S(z) are
continuously diﬀerentiable. Given the common boundary conditions (see Lemma 2) we
have U∗A(z) = U
∗
B(z). In equilibrium, x
∗(z) > γN(z) (except perhaps at z). It follows











Figure 2: Regime H: a worker with given ability zˆ has a match SA under the stochas-
tically lower distribution of jobs HA that is worse than the match SB under the higher
distribution of jobs HB.
Suppose the claim is false, and there exists at least one interval on (z, z˜] where
U∗A(z) ≥ U∗B(z). Let us denote the set of points as IU = {z ∈ (z, z¯] : U∗A(z) >
U∗B(z)} (possibly disjoint), and let z1 = inf IU ≥ z. We can find a z2 ∈ IU such
that U∗A(z) > U
∗
B(z) for all z in (z1, z2]. Note that since, by the common boundary
condition, U∗A(z) = U
∗








7 As U∗A(z) > U
∗
B(z) and SA(z) ≤ SB(z) for all z ∈ IU , it must be
that xA(z) < xB(z) for all z ∈ IU . But then as U∗0 is increasing in x(z) and increasing
in S(z), we have U∗0A (z) ≤ U∗0B (z) on IU . This, together with U∗A(z1) = U∗B(z1), implies
U∗A(z) ≤ U∗B(z) for all z ∈ (z1, z2], which is a contradiction.
The next result shows that an increase in relative competition reduces investment
by low ability types, but stimulates greater investment by high types. For this re-
sult, I make the further assumption that S0A(z) < S
0
B(z). This is a weak refinement
to stochastic dominance. Note that if, for example, GA(z) first order stochastically










Proposition 9 Suppose that S0A(z) < S
0
B(z) and either GA(z) first order stochastically
dominates GB(z), or HB(z) first order stochastically dominates HA(z). Let xA and xB
be the solutions to the diﬀerential equation (6) under SA(z) and SB(z) respectively.
Then, xB(z) > xA(z) on (z, z˜) for some z˜ > z; there is then at least one crossing of
xB(z) and xA(z) on (z˜, z¯) so that xA(z¯) ≥ xB(z¯).
7For example, it is not possible that U∗A(z) > U
∗











Figure 3: Under NTU, investment in the more competitive environment xA is further
from the social optimum γ∗N for low and high ability workers than investment in the
less competitive environment xB.





0(z). So, xB(z) > xA(z) immediately
to the right of z. Suppose there is no crossing on (z, z¯), so that xA(z¯) < xB(z¯) which
implies that, as SA(z¯) = SB(z¯) = s, the utility for the highest type must be ranked
U∗A(z¯) > U
∗
B(z¯), which is a contradiction to our earlier result, Proposition 8.
The comparative statics results on equilibrium investment are less precise than those
on equilibrium utility. It is possible to obtain stronger results by making stronger
assumptions. See Hopkins and Kornienko (2005) for examples of such results.
All the same, the results on investment do have a striking conclusion, as illustrated
in Figure 3. In the more competitive environment, which has a matching function SA(z)
from the point of view of workers, distortions from the socially optimal are larger. In
particular, the low type workers who in any case invest too little will invest even less.
And the high ability workers who put in too much eﬀort will do even more.
6.2 TU
In this section, it is assumed that output depends only on the types involved in the
match (Story 2A) or π(z, s). This implies that the equilibrium diﬀerential equations
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reduce to
x0(z) = −Uw(z, w(z), x)
Ux(z, w(z), x)
w0(z) = ψ(z, w(z), x)πz(z, S(z)) (20)
and
w0(z) = πz(z, S(z)). (21)
Proposition 10 Let πzs(z, s) > 0. Then either if GA(z) first order stochastically
dominates GB(z), or if HB(z) first order stochastically dominates HA(z), it follows
that wA(z) ≤ wB(z) for all z ∈ [z, z¯].
Proof: If GA(z) first order stochastically dominates GB(z), or if HB(z) first order
stochastically dominates HA(z), then SA(z) ≤ SB(z) for all z ∈ [z, z¯] (see Propositions
6 and 7). Hence, from the relationship (10) and the assumption πzs > 0, it must be that
w0A(z) ≤ w0B(z) for all z ∈ [z, z¯] and, given a common boundary condition w(z) = C,
the result follows.
This in turn implies a similar result on workers’ utility. Let U(z, w(z), x(z)) = U∗(z)
be workers’ equilibrium utility under TU.
Proposition 11 Suppose either GA(z) first order stochastically dominates GB(z), or
HB(z) first order stochastically dominates HA(z). Then, U
∗
A(z) ≤ U∗B(z) for all z in
[z, z¯].
Proof: By the above Proposition 10, wA(z) ≤ wB(z) for all z ∈ [z, z¯]. We have by the
envelope theorem dU∗(z, w(z), x(z))/dz = Uz(z, w(z), x(z)). Then, the proof is readily
adaptable from the proof to the earlier result, Proposition 8.
We can also find a similar result on the behaviour of investment.
Proposition 12 Suppose that S0A(z) < S
0
B(z) and either GA(z) first order stochasti-
cally dominates GB(z), or HB(z) first order stochastically dominates HA(z). Let xA and
xB be the solutions to the diﬀerential equation (20) under SA(z) and SB(z) respectively.
Then, xB(z) > xA(z) on (z, z˜) for some z˜ > z.
Proof: Given the common boundary condition that xA(z) = xB(z) = γT (z) and that
SA(z) = SB(z) = s, evaluating the diﬀerential equation (20) at z, we find that x0A(z) =
x0B(z). However,
x00A(z)− x00B(z) = −ψ(z, s, x(z))πzs(z, s) (S0A(z)− S0B(z)) < 0.
This implies that x0A(z) < x
0
B(z) immediately to the right of z and the result follows.
Suppose there is no crossing
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7 Unemployment
Up to now, it has been assumed that all workers are matched to jobs. Obviously, it is
a characteristic of many real world labour markets that the least successful candidates
fail to attract any oﬀers as there are more candidates than there are job openings. It
is relatively easy to modify the basic matching tournament model to allow for this. We
find again that the model delivers sensible comparative statics. For example, a decrease
in the number of jobs available relative to the number of workers will, in the TU case,
lower wages at every level of ability.
Assume now that that the measure of firms relative to that of workers is 1 − µ
so that a proportion µ > 0 of workers will not find employment. Under assortative
matching, these will be the least able, so that those having ability on the range [z, zˆ),
where G(zˆ) = µ, will be unemployed. The utility from unemployment we take to be s0,
where 0 ≤ s0 ≤ s. Together this implies the following assortative matching scheme
S(z) =






for z ∈ [zˆ, z¯]. (22)
This implies that S0(z) is equal to zero on (z, zˆ) and to g(z)/(h(S(z))(1− µ)) on [zˆ, z¯].
7.1 NTU
Again it is possible to construct a symmetric separating equilibrium based on assortative
matching. Those workers who anticipate unemployment will not invest any more than
the cooperative level. However, if the cooperative solution is increasing in ability, this
will still be separating. A greater problem is that if the worst job is strictly better than
unemployment, there must be a jump in the equilibrium strategy x(z) at zˆ to prevent
unemployed workers imitating the investment levels of those who are successful.
Proposition 13 Let x(z) = γN(z) on [z, zˆ) where µ = G(zˆ). Let xˆ ≥ γN(zˆ) solve
U(zˆ, xˆ, s) = U(zˆ, γN(zˆ), s0). Let x(z) be the solution to (6) on [zˆ, z¯] with boundary
condition x(zˆ) = xˆ. Then, x(z), together with the matching scheme (22), is a symmetric
equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under NTU.
Proof: First, note that, in the proposed equilibrium, investment levels on the interval
(γN(zˆ), xˆ) are oﬀ the equilibrium path. Assume that if any worker deviates and chooses
x on that interval, firms believe with probability 1 that her type z is strictly less than zˆ.
Then any deviation by any unemployed worker to any level of x in [0, xˆ) will not result
in a job oﬀer. There is, therefore, no incentive to make such a deviation. Deviation to
a level of x above xˆ is unprofitable by the definition of xˆ. For workers of type z ∈ [zˆ, z¯],
the equilibrium is the same as in the case of full employment.
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The obvious question is what happens if the ratio of workers to jobs increases.
Clearly, unemployment goes up, but we can also show that worker utility falls as the
job market becomes more competitive.





B(z) be the equilibrium strategy and utility respectively under the two re-
spective values of µ. Then, U∗A(z) < U
∗
B(z) for all z ∈ (zˆB, z¯]. Further, xA(z) < xB(z)
on (zˆB, z˜) for some z˜ > zˆB, but there is at least one crossing so that xA(z¯) ≥ xB(z¯).
Proof: A proof of first part is readily derivable from the proof of Proposition 8, simply
replacing z with zˆB at each point of the proof. Proof of the second part, concerning xA(z)
and xB(z) similarly follows from Proposition 9. Note that xB(zˆB) ≥ xA(zˆB). If s0 = s,






N(zˆB). If xB(zˆB) > xA(zˆB),
then the result follows from the continuity of x and that U∗A(z¯) ≤ U∗B(z¯).
7.2 TU
Under TU, it is simplest to work under Story 2A and assume that output is not eﬀected
by investment, or π(z, s). Assume also that the µ unmatched workers are paid a fixed
wage or benefit w, whose level is exogenously fixed. Then, this return to unemployment




πz(t, S(t)) dt+ C, (23)
where w ≤ C ≤ π(zˆ, s). Then, we have the following equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Let x(z) = γT (z) on [z, zˆ) where µ = G(zˆ). Let xˆ ≥ γT (zˆ) solve
U(zˆ, xˆ, C) = U(zˆ, γT (zˆ), w). Let w(z) = w on [z, zˆ] and be given by (23) on (zˆ, z¯]. Let
x(z) be the solution to (11) on [zˆ, z¯] with boundary condition x(zˆ) = xˆ. Then, x(z) is a
symmetric equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under TU.
It is also possible to show that an increase in unemployment will lower wages.





B(z) be the equilibrium wage, strategy and utility respectively under the two




B(z) on (zˆB, z¯).
Proof: Note that, while SA(zˆB) = SB(zˆB), it holds that SA(z) < SB(z) on (zˆB, z], and




This paper has introduced a model of relative signalling in a tournament-like labour
market. By allowing for vertical diﬀerentiation amongst employers as well as workers,
it generalises the classic model of Spence (1973). Competition for good jobs generates
competition for relative position, implying that the outcome for any individual worker
depend on the distribution characteristics of all firms and all workers. Changes in either
distribution, representing changes in the demand and supply of labour respectively,
aﬀect equilibrium strategies and welfare.
In some research in incomplete information, lack of dependence on the distribution
of types is taken to be an advantage. However, this is in the context of a diﬀerent type of
signalling model. Take for example a classic industrial organisation model of predation
where an incumbent monopolist signals unobservable costs by its output choices. Note
that in this case the distribution of types is the potential entrant’s subjective beliefs
about the unknown costs of the incumbent. The probability distribution in this case is
subjective and largely unobservable as it is in the mind of the entrant. In contrast, in
the labour market model considered here, the approach to beliefs is in eﬀect frequentist
as the distribution of types is simply the empirical distribution of workers’ (or firms’)
qualities. The dependence of the type distribution is more natural in this context, where
the distribution is observable and measurable.
The equilibria in this model, as is common under imperfect information, are not
eﬃcient. Typically, workers overinvest in education as education as well as increasing
productivity also serves as a signal of ability. This oﬀers the unusual prospect of labour
taxes increasing rather than decreasing labour market eﬃciency. However, it was also
found that low ability workers could potentially underinvest in developing useful skills,
giving some rationale for a progressive tax and subsidy scheme.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: In a symmetric equilibrium with a strictly increasing strategy
x(z), for an agent of type zi we have F (x(zi)) = Pr[x(zi) < x(z)] = Pr[x
−1(x(zi)) <
z] = G(zi). Then the matching that assigns an agent with output xi to an firm of type
si = H
−1(F (xi)) = H
−1(G(zi)) is clearly stable as while any worker with rank F (xi)
would prefer a match with any firm with s > H−1(F (xi)), such a firm would prefer
her current match whose x, say xˆ, would be greater than xi (and as x(z) is strictly
increasing, zˆ = x−1(xˆ) > zi). Suppose there is another matching φ˜, such that a set
of workers X with positive measure are matched diﬀerently than under the positive
assortive matching φ. Then, there must exist xˆ ∈ X, such that φ˜(F (xˆ)) > F (xˆ), that
is, there must be a positive measure of workers who are matched strictly higher than
under φ. For this matching to be stable, all workers with output higher than xˆ must
be matched with firms whose s is greater than φ˜(F (xˆ)). If not, then firm s = φ˜(F (xˆ))
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could propose a match with a worker of type x˜ where x˜ > xˆ and the worker x˜ would find
it acceptable. But the measure of workers with x higher than xˆ, λ(x ≥ xˆ), is strictly
larger than the measure of firms with s greater than φ˜(F (xˆ)), λ(s ≥ φ˜(F (xˆ))). But this
implies that φ˜ is not measure-preserving.
Proof of Proposition 1: This follows from Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath (1987,
p1353). The only substantial diﬀerence is that in that work, the signaller’s utility
is of the form (in current notation) V (z, zˆ, x) where V is a smooth utility function
and zˆ is the perceived type, so that in a separating equilibrium the signaller has util-
ity V (z, z, x). Now, clearly, one can find a smooth utility function V (·) such that
U(z, s, x) = V (z, zˆ, x) everywhere on [z, z¯] × [s, s¯] × IR+. In particular, fix G(z) and
H(s), and then U(z, S(z), x) = V (z, z, x). One can then verify that the conditions 1-4
imposed on U(·) imply conditions 1-5 of Mailath (1987, p1352) on V .8
It also follows by Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987, p1362) that x(z) 6= γN(z) on (z, z¯).
Since zˆ maximises U(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)), we have a first order condition Us(z, S(z), x(z)) +
Ux(z, S(z), x(z))x
0(z). By assumption 4. on U(·) and the definition of γN , Ux(z, S(z), x) <
0 for x > γN(z), and as Us > 0 everywhere by assumption, it follows that x(z) >
γN(z).
Proof of Proposition 2: Taking Becker’s (1973) hint that in the continuous case, the
exact payment should be determinable, we obtain from (8),
w(z + ε, x)− w(z, x) ≥ π(z + ε, S(z), x)− π(z, S(z), x).
Dividing both sides by ² and taking the limit of ² to zero, one finds that
wz(z, x) ≥ πz(z, S(z), x). (24)
Similarly from (9), one obtains
wx(z, x) ≥ πx(z, S(z), x). (25)
This also give us a bound on the total derivative dw(z, x)/dz ≥ πz + πxx0. A similar
analysis finds that the share of the firm satisfies
dr(z, x)/dz ≥ πs(z, S(z), x)S0(z) (26)
But since dw(z, x)/dz + dr(z, x)/dz = dπ(z, S(z), x)/dz = πxx
0(z) + πz + S0(z)πs, the
above conditions hold with equality. The choice of the boundary condition C = w(z)
is arbitrary, except that it must be feasible, i.e. 0 ≤ w(z) ≤ π(z, s, x(z)).
These marginal conditions imply general stability. Take any two types of worker
z1, z2 with z2 > z1. The stability condition (8) using the formula (10) can be rewritten
8Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposiition 5 (1987, p1364), also assumes that ∂V/∂zˆ
is bounded. Here, if we assume that both Us and S
0(z) are bounded (the latter requires g(·) is bounded




πz(z, S(z), x(z)) + πx(z, S(z), x(z))x
0(z) dz ≥ (27)Z z2
z1
πz(z, S(z1), x(z)) + πx(z, S(z1), x(z))x
0(z) dz.
Now, as matching is positive and assortative, the matching function S(z) is increasing
and S(z) > S(z1) for any z ∈ (z1, z2]. If, as assumed, πzs > 0 and πxs ≥ 0 then the
above equality must hold for any pair z2 > z1.
Proof of Proposition 3: This follows the proof of Proposition 1. Fix S(z). Fix
w(z, x) as a smooth increasing function [z, z¯] × IR :7→ IR, with partial derivatives as
given in (10). Then, it is possible to find a smooth utility function V (·) such that
U(z, w(z, x), x) = V (z, zˆ, x) everywhere on [z, z¯] × IR2+. It is then possible to verify
that the conditions 1.-5. imposed on U imply Mailath’s (1987, p1352) conditions 1.-
5. on V . In particular, note that V3 = Ux + πxUw. Mailath’s condition (4) requires
that V3(z, z, x) = 0 has a unique solution. This here follows from the assumptions that
πxx < 0, and assumptions 4 and 5 on U .
9 Existence of an incentive compatible signalling
equilibrium then follows from Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath. However, for assortative
matching to be stable, the wage function must satisfy (10). That is, solutions to the
simultaneous diﬀerential equations (11) and
w0(z) = πx(z, S(z), x)x0(z) + πz(z, S(z), x) =
πz(z, S(z), x)Ux(z, w, x)
Ux(z, w, x) + πx(z, S(z), x)Uw(z, w, x)
give the equilibrium investment and wage functions.
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